Europe Has Run Out Of Time

With Trump’s Return, the Continent Must Take Charge of Its Own Security—and Quickly

For decades, the transatlantic al­liance has been the bedrock of European security. But today, Europe’s partnership with the United States is at a critical juncture. With Donald Trump’s return to the White House, there is a genuine risk that U.S. engagement in Europe could drop precipitously. If the United States halts its military aid to Kyiv, the con­sequences will be profound, both for the war in Ukraine and for the rest of Europe’s defenses against exter­nal threats, a revanchist Russia chief among them.

Although Trump’s second term will most likely usher in a radical break from previous U.S. policy, the reality is that discontent with the European contribution to the transatlantic rela­tionship has been simmering in the United States for years. Europe, howev­er, squandered the time it should have spent investing more heavily into the relationship—including by building up its own defenses. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022 should have been the final wake-up call, creating real momentum behind Europe’s effort to become a credible security actor in its own right. Instead, once again, it relied on the United States to take the lead in a European war. Now, that fall­back option is at risk of disappearing, and European leaders cannot simply shift the blame for their predicament to Washington.

European leaders must act deci­sively to advance a unified strategy to ensure the continent’s peace and stability. They must quickly ramp up their economic and military support for Ukraine, begin a serious effort to create an integrated European defense industry, and demonstrate to the Unit­ed States that Europe is prepared to hold up its side of a mutually beneficial partnership. From now on, Europe’s security will have to be European—or it won’t exist at all.

No Turning Back

Since the United States entered World War II, it has considered Eu­ropean security to be a fundamental U.S. interest. Only with the support of a stable, peaceful Europe could the United States project power glob­ally. Washington’s engagement with Europe was never only about strat­egy, however. The alliance was also values-based, grounded in a shared commitment to defend democracy against dictatorship. During the Cold War, the transatlantic partnership strengthened further. The formation of NATO, in 1949, created an American security umbrella that enabled Europe to rebuild and thrive, and the U.S.-Eu­ropean economic and military partner­ship over the next several decades was an overwhelming success.

With the end of the Cold War and the beginning of a new era of U.S. unipolar power, however, a danger­ous sense of complacency set in on both sides of the Atlantic. The rela­tive stability of this period led many European countries to reduce their defense spending, assuming that war had been banished from the continent for good. Most European armies were restructured to focus on interventions abroad, and in the process neglected their ability to accomplish homeland defense. Meanwhile, the United States became entangled in costly conflicts in the Middle East that stretched its resources thin.

During those years, Europe and the United States ignored or downplayed rising threats. Starting roughly a de­cade ago, Russian and Chinese chal­lenges to the U.S.-led international order began to grow. In 2014, Russia an­nexed Crimea and launched a war in the Donbas region of Ukraine. After Xi Jinping assumed leadership of China, in 2012, he overhauled China’s econom­ic and foreign policy and positioned the country as a global power determined to stand on equal footing with the Unit­ed States. At home, Western countries grappled with the negative effects of globalization, including industrial de­cline, diminished competitiveness, an erosion of social cohesion, and discon­tent with the political status quo.

In his 2016 U.S. presidential cam­paign, Trump effectively channeled the public grievances that arose from these problems. Many Americans had become disillusioned with global leadership, angry that large amounts of taxpayer money were spent on U.S. activities abroad while parts of the country struggled. Trump’s vow to put “America first” and demand that allies pay up resonated. What many on the other side of the Atlantic understood too late was that although Trump’s voice may have been the loudest, the underlying sentiment—at least as it applied to Europe—was widespread within the U.S. political establishment. Even Trump’s predecessor, President Barack Obama, had concluded that the United States should reduce its footprint in Europe and the Middle East in order to shift its focus to the Indo-Pacific.

The misguided hope, which many European leaders have held since 2016, that Europe can simply wait out the Trump presidency must be consigned to the dustbin of history. Although the Russian war against Ukraine led the Biden administration to reprioritize European security, this was only a tem­porary deviation, not a general change in U.S. strategy. Today, not all U.S. lead­ers would draw back Washington’s commitment to Europe as quickly— or speak of the alliance with as harsh a tone—as Trump may be inclined to do. But these differences aside, they will likely agree with Trump’s basic demand that Europe take significant­ly greater responsibility for its own security.

For Europe, then, there is no time left to waste. Trump has repeatedly ex­pressed his support for an immediate halt to any U.S. military aid to Ukraine, and Europe must prepare for the possi­bility that for the first time since World War II, it will be the principal party tasked with ending a major conflict on the continent. An even bigger risk is that Trump might pursue a deal with Russian President Vladimir Putin to freeze the fighting. Putin understands that once Trump enters negotiations, he will face domestic pressure to close a deal—a constraint that Putin does not share. This imbalance gives Putin leverage, and any deal that emerg­es from such negotiations would be highly unlikely to include adequate protections for Ukraine—and thus for Europe—against future Russian ag­gression. For Washington to essential­ly accommodate Moscow’s war aims would critically undermine NATO’s credibility, shaking the foundations of Europe’s security architecture.

Capacity Building

Europe now has no choice but to manage its own security. There is no doubt that it has the economic poten­tial to do so; the combined GDP of the European Union is roughly ten times that of Russia. What holds Europe back is a lack of political will. That deficiency of will is glaringly obvious when it comes to military support for Ukraine: the technologically backward and economically decrepit North Ko­rea is estimated to have supplied more artillery shells to Russia during the past year than the entire EU has pro­vided to Ukraine over the same period. This pitiful state of affairs has arisen even though the EU has a strong indus­trial base and counts four of the world’s ten largest arms exporters among its members.

Europe needs to step up its de­fense capabilities—and fast. But this project requires political leadership, which is currently hard to come by. In Germany, the coalition government has collapsed, and the country’s poli­ticians will spend the coming months occupied by snap elections scheduled for February 23 and the coalition-build­ing process that will follow. In France, President Emmanuel Macron lost his parliamentary majority this summer, leaving him politically weakened. Meanwhile, the EU’s relationship with the United Kingdom, one of Europe’s most formidable military powers, re­mains fraught, even as both sides make sincere efforts to improve cooperation.

Fortunately, other EU members such as Poland, the Baltic states, and the Nordic countries are willing to take the lead. Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk is already trying to bring togeth­er leading European NATO states to improve coordination on Ukraine and ramp up support for Kyiv. But any substantial defense buildup will need Germany’s economic power and political clout to succeed, which means that the new government in Berlin will need to take the continent’s security challenges seriously and be willing to put money behind a broader European effort.

Anticipating a withdrawal of U.S. support, Europe also needs to signifi­cantly increase its financial and mili­tary support for Ukraine. According to the Kiel Institute for the World Econ­omy’s Ukraine Support Tracker, the combined military aid that Germany, France, and the United Kingdom have supplied to Ukraine since the start of the full-scale war is less than half what the United States has contributed. Al­though it may not be feasible to imme­diately and completely fill the gap left by the United States, the goal should be to come as close as possible. For a start, EU countries will need to turn to inter­national markets, including the United States, to purchase weapons systems and ammunition that Europe cannot yet produce in sufficient quantities it­self. Germany in particular should also take steps that it has been delaying for far too long: sending long-range Tau­rus missiles to Ukraine and removing the remaining restrictions on Kyiv us­ing Western weapons to strike military targets deep inside Russia. The United States recently lifted these restrictions on the use of its ATACMS missiles, and France and the United Kingdom, which have already delivered their own cruise missiles to Ukraine, seem to be following suit.

In the medium to long term, the EU will need to overhaul its defense capabilities and industry if Europe is to meaningfully backstop its own secu­rity. Right now, Europe purchases the lion’s share of its arms from abroad; this practice must come to an end. A credible security provider must be able to meet most of its own defense needs. Europe will have to overcome the national self-interests that treat defense industries as mere extensions of domestic industrial policy. Instead, these industries must be reshaped to serve Europe’s collective security inter­ests. This will require the continent’s foremost military powers—France, Germany, Italy, Poland, and the Unit­ed Kingdom—to lead the development of a joint European strategy. In prac­tice, the process will involve scaling up production and cutting costs by integrating every part of the produc­tion cycle, from capability planning to development to procurement. If this integration is managed successfully, the European defense industry can compete on the level of the U.S. defense sector.

Securing Europe’s Future

A failure to prioritize defense efforts now will leave Europe deeply vulner­able to continued Russian aggression. Any reluctance to take on more of the continental defense burden, moreover, will strain transatlantic relations at a critical time. Retaining the United States as a security partner is unde­niably in Europe’s interest. But to do so requires that Europe be proactive, constructively engaging Washington to work out a new balance of respon­sibilities and to discuss shared security goals.

This includes improving transat­lantic cooperation on issues beyond Europe. First and foremost, the Eu­ropean Union—including both the European Commission and national capitals—and the United States must align their strategies for addressing the axis of hostile powers that are working to challenge the internation­al order. China, Iran, and North Korea are supporting the Russian war in Ukraine by providing weapons and dual-use goods, while Russia is sup­porting the Iranian-backed Houthis in Yemen. On top of this, China has exploited the West’s distraction to ex­pand its power in the Indo-Pacific and beyond. Beijing is taking a close look at the Western response in Ukraine, contemplating Russia’s invasion as a potential blueprint for an attack on Taiwan. It would be shortsighted for the United States and Europe to view these threats in isolation or to attempt to counter them alone. If leaders on both sides of the Atlantic want the international liberal order to endure, with the United States at its core, they must tackle these challenges together.

It is now up to Europeans to fulfill the continent’s potential as a credi­ble security actor, thereby salvaging transatlantic relations and checking Russia’s imperialist ambitions. Should this effort fall short—and should U.S. support fall away—the price will be steep. Without strong defenses stand­ing in his way, Putin will have no rea­son to stop at Ukraine. After decades of relative peace, war could once again become a fixture of European politics.

Source: FOREIGN AFFAIRS (www. foreignaffairs.com), November 22, 2024.